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writers as a follower of the Massachusetts exception, but the case of
Gehrke v. State, 13 Tex., 568, upon
which they rely, does not support
their position, nor do the later decisions in the Texas courts regard it
an authority. In that case an effort
was made to prove insanity not by
the knowledge of the witness of the
fact of insanity, but by comparison
of some other insane person that
the witness sqid he knew, and who
was known to be insane. It is true
that the Court said that it would be
equally improper to receive the
vague expression that the prisoner
looked or acted like an insane person; but this seems to be on the

ground that experts were present
who might have been examined
had they been called. Ini Thomas
v. State, 4o Tex., 6o, the Court, in
holding the opinions of non-professional witnesses as to insanity
admissible, expressly said: "The
views here expressed are not in
conflict with the case of Gehrke v.
State. That case is not in point:"
McClackey v. State, 4r Tex., 125;
McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. App.,
320; Webb v. State, Id., 596; Campbell v. State, io Tex. App., 560.
Maine and Massachusetts alone
now maintain the exception to what
has become the universal rule.
HENRY N. SmALTZ.
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Equity-Fraud-ConflentialRelation-Ofcerof Corporationand
Stockholder.
Plaintiff, a stockholder in a corporation, applied to defendant, the
secretary of the company, for information as to the condition of the company and the value of its stock. Defendant stated what tile earnings of
the company had been, but did not state that a lease of a portion of the
company's property had been made, containing an option to lessee to
lease additional property. Defendant then made plaintiff an offer for his
stock, which plaintiff accepted. Soon after, the option under the lease
having been exercised, the stock rose greatly in value, and plaintiff having demanded a retransfer of his stock and been refused, filed a bill. The
master found, as a fact, that at the time defendant bought plaintiffs stock
he did not know of anything that was pending, or of any movement in
contemplation, likely to cause a rise in the value of the stock.
31 W. N. C., 244; 151 Pa., 223.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Held, that under these circumstances a reconveyance of the stock
would not be decreed.
Whether the relation between an officer of a corporation and a stockholder is of a confiddntial or fiduciary character not determined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

It was not denied that the plaintiff went to the defendant, who was the secretary of the corporation, for the purpose of finding out what the stock was worth. Prior to
that time the highest price paid for the stock in the market
had been $42.50 per share. At that time the directors of
the company had made a lease to another corporation of
certain wharf property of the company, which lease contained an option to the lessee to take all of the company's
property of that character, and at that time the president
and vice-president of the company were urging the lessee
to exercise this option. Plaintiff did not know these facts.
The master found that the defendant's only knowledge of
the negotiation at the time consisted in the knowledge of
the first lease, which was considered rather disadvantageous
than otherwise by the officers of the defendant's company,
and that the existence of that lease was well known to the
stockholders, and defendant had a right to assume that it
was known to the plaintiff also. Defendant offered to buy
plaintiifs stock, and eventually did buy it at $55 per share.
A month later the option of the lessee having been exercised and all the property .leased, the stock rose to $i25 per
share.
The master found that the plaintiff's bill, which specifically charged fraud and misrepresentation, was overcome by
the answer, which was responsive; the bill not being sustained by the two witnesses required by the equity rule.
He also found independently that no fraud on defendant's
part was shown. As a question of law he held that there
was no relation of confidence between the plaintiff and
defendant under the circumstances of the case.
The last proposition was not referred to in the opinion
of the Supreme Court (unless it be covered by the statement that they are not convinced "that there is any sub-

RELATION OF OFFICER TO STOCKIIODI)ER.

stantial error in the findings of fact or conclusions of law"),
but the "controlling facts" were said to be the master's
findings that "at the time defendant bought the plaintiff's
stock lie did not know of anything that was pending, or of
any movement in contemplation likely to cause a rise in
the value of the stock, and of course lie had no knowledge
to impart to the plaintiff which he unfairly or improperly
concealed;" that the first lease was not considered specially advantageous, and that defendant might presume that
plaintiff knew of that.
RELATION OF OFrICER OF CORPORATION TO INDIVIDUAL

STOCKHOLDER.
This case suggests, though it cannot be said to determine, an interesting question. That question is
the relation which an officer or
director of a corporation bears to
the individual stockholders.
The relation of the directors or
officers to the corporation, that is,
to !he body of stockholders, is sufficiently well understood, and is
usually spoken of as a trust relation, the common expression being
that the directors or other officers
are trustees for the stockholders.
It has been pointed out that this is
not strictly correct. In Spering's
Appeal, 71 Pa., II, SHARSVOOD, J.,
says : "They are undoubtedly said
in many authorities to be trustees,
but that, I apprehend, is only in a
general sense as we term an agent,
or any bailee entrusted with the
care and management of the property of another; it is certain they
are not technical trustees."
In
Smith v. Anderson, 15 Ch. D., 247,
p. 275, JAIMEs, L. J., says: "To my
mind the distinction between a director and trustee is an essential
distinction founded on the very nature of things. A trustee is a man
who is the owner of the property
and deals with it as principal, as

owner and as master, subject only
to an equitable obligation to account
to some persons to whom he stands
in the relation of trustee, and who
are his cestuis que trust. The same
individual may fill the- office of director and also be a trustee having
property, but that is a rare, exceptional and casual circumstance.
The office of a director is that of a
paid servant of the company. A
director never enters into a contract for himself, but he enters into
contracts for his principal, that is,
for the company of whom he is a
director, and for whom he is acting.
He cannot sue on such contracts
nor be sued on them unless he exceeds his authority. That seems to
me the broad distinction between
trustees and directors."
In many cases the determination
of the exact relation becomes important, as, for example, in cases
of contracts, leases, dealings between corporations having stockholders or directors in common.
These questions are discussed in
numerous decisions. (See Morawetz, Private Corporations, / S16
el seq.; Beach, Private Corporations, Chap. XIII; Bigelow on
Fraud, pp. 325 et seq.; The Fiduci-
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ary Position of Directors, 8o L. T.,
299; The Fiduciary Relation
of
Directors to Shareholders, 26 Can.
L. J. 66.)
It would seem that the relation
of an officer or a director to an individual stockholder is not, broadly
speaking, a fiduciary relation. The
question is one which, strange to
say, appears to have seldom arisen,
for the circumstances of the principal case would seem to be such as
might be expected to occur quite
commonly. The first impression
of the Courts and of the Bar would
seem to have been to the contrary
effect, apparently owing to the fact
that the custom of speaking of the
officers and directors as trustees for
the stockholders naturally influenced the inquirer to regard this
relation as extending to the individual stockholder. The question,
however, has been treated in several well-considered opinions, and
the result arrived at has been uniformly against the existence of a
trust relation.
The earliest reported case appears to be Carpenter v. Danforth,
52 Barb., 581 (1868).
The defendant, who was a director of the corporation, had stated to the plaintiff
that he would give him a better
price for his stock than he could
get elsewhere, and the plaintiff,
without making special investigation, acceded to the terms which
were offered. The price paid was
the market price of the stock at the
time, but it was well known to the
defendant, and not within the
knowledge of the plaintiff, that the
United States government had entered into a contract with the corporation which would prove exceedingly profitable. The question"
arose, therefore, whether there was
a trust relation requiring disclosure

on the part of defendant, orwhether
actual, positive fraud was necessary
for a rescission. The Supreme
Court of New York, in a carefully
considered opinion by Mr. Justice
SUTHERLAND, held that there was
certainly a trust relation between
the plaintiff as a stockholder and
the defendant as a trustee or director; but the trust only extended
to the "management of the general
affairs of the corporation, with a
view to dividends of profits;" and
that plaintiff's stock was not the subject of trust between them. "My
conclusion is, then," he continues,
"that this case is not a case of con.
structive fraud- that there was not
any such trust or confidential relation between the plaintiff and Danforth as to make the principle of
equity which has been referred to
reasonably applicable to the case.
In view of the .pleadings and of the
conceded facts of the case, I think
it follows that the sale in question,
if set aside, must be set aside on the
ground of actual, positive fraud."
The case of Commissioners of
Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds,
44 Ind., 509; 13 AMERICAN LAw
REGISTER

AND

R

EVzw,

N.

S.,

376 (1873), is a leading case. The
allegations which the Court seems
to treat as established were that
the county, plaintiff, owned 570
shares of stock of a railroad company of which defendant was president and principal manager; that
this stock was worth $342,ooo; that
the condition of the company had
been concealed by the defendant by
failing to declare dividends and by
representations that the stock was
not worth its face, and by failing
to show the condition of the affairs
of the company; that plaintiff was
ignorant of the value of the stock,
which defendant knew; that he
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that must be a stockholder. . ..
represented that the depreciatioir
of the value of the stock had been
After all, the simple question incaused by losses sustained, when
volved is whether the officers and
he knew that the accumulations
directors are free to purchase stock
were sufficient to pay all debts and
from a shareholder in the corporalosses and leave the stock iioo per
tion on the same terms as others.
cent. above par; that defendant,
To this there can be but one answer,
through an agent, purchased plain- that is, they may, unless prohibited
tiff's stock at go per cent. of its par by legislative restriction.'
After this came Grant v'. Attrill,
value; that defendant was then
negotiating a sale of the road and
ii Fed. Rep., 469 (1882), which was
subsequently sold it for '2,500,000,
to the same effect; as was also, it
the par value being $250,000.
would seem, so far as it goes, Perry
WORDEN, J., said: "defendant
v. Pearson, 135 Ill., 218 (izgo), Gildoubtless knew much more about
bert's Case, L. R., i5 Ch. App., 559
the condition of the affairs of the
(1870) may, perhaps, be said to be
company and the value of the the converse of these cases, since the
stock, both present and prospec- ruling there was that a director was
tive, than the plaintiff. He pur- not a trustee of his owz stock for
chased the stock greatly below its
other stockholders in the sense
real value, as subsequent events that he should be forbidden to rid
established,.but he paid the market
himself of it, if by so doing he invalue at the time, so far as it seems
creased their burdens, and the case
to have had a market value. Had
is approved re South London Fish
the defendant not been connected
Market Company, 39 Ch. D., 324,
with the company as one of its
but the point we are considering
officers, there is nothing in the
does not appear to have arisen in
case that would fulrnish any reason- England.
able ground to claim that the purFinally, the question arose in
chase was in any manner infected
New Jersey, in the case of Crowell
with fraud. It is not shown by the v. Jackson, 53 N.J. L., 656 (189n,
evidence that there was any special
in an action of deceit, the plaintiff
trust or confidence reposed in the alleging that defendant, who was a
defendant by the plaintiff, which
director and treasurer of the comwas violated by the former, or of pany, knew of an advantageous
which he took advantage."
He sale of the company's property, o"
then cites with approval and fol- which defendant did not know, anC
lows Carpenter v. Danforth, stifira. as to which there was nothing t(
DownEY, C. J., dissented. Dead- put him on inquiry. It is to bt
observed that this was a commoi
erick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt., 109 (1874)
was the next decision, and FREE- law action of tort. The unanimou
MAN, J., after citing Spering's Ap- opinion of the Court was expresser
peal and Commissioners v. Rey- by MCGILL, C., as follows: " Wnolds, sufira, says: "There. being
are of the opinion that, in contem
no limit to the amount which he
plation of law, there can be n
(a director) may own, as a matter
rraud without moral delinquency
in other words, that there is no a.
of course he may purchase it, and
if he may do this, he must neces- tual fraud which is not also mor
fraud. In purchase or sale, if thei
sarily do so from an owner, and
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be no designed misrepresentation by are entitled to take advantage of
words or deeds and no active inten- their knowledge of facts not known
tional concealment, and no inten- to the latter, but which the directional silence where there is a duty tors are acquainted with by reason
to speak, an action of deceit will
of their official position, seems
And
not lie. A director or the treasurer of questionable propriety."
of a corporation is not, because of Bigelowsays of the same case: "It
was held that in the absence of
his office, in duty bound to disclose
to an individual stockholder before
actual fraud the sale was valid. It
purchasing his stock that which he
was considered that such a case did
not disclose a relation of trustee
may know as to the real condition
of the- corporation affecting the and cestui que trust. But the decision was not unanimous, and the
value of that stock. He is to some
extent trustee for the stockholders subject is worthy of further consideration. The Court was perhaps
as a body in respect to the property
and business of the corporation,
correct in holding that the presibut does not sustain that relation
dent of the company was not, in
to individual stockholders with re- strictness, a trustee toward the
spect to their several holdings of vendor; but it is quite another
stock over which he has no control. thing to §ay that no relation of
We approve the conclusions reached confidence and trust existed between the parties. And that i s all
by the'Supreme Court of Indiana
in The Commissioners of Tippethat is necessary to require discanoe Co. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind.,
closure:" Bigelow on Fraud, 330.
509, which are distinctly in point
Yet it is hard to escape from the
with the questions here raised.
common-sense view of the TenIt may seem to have been a waste
nessee Judge-if directors can buy
of time to collect the authorities at all (and their right to do so must
merely with the result of showing
be conceded) they can only buy
an unbroken line of decisions to
from those who can sell, who are
the same effect. But, in the first
necessarily the stockholders. And
place, the point is interesting and it would be difficult, perhaps, to
restrict the right without hamperimportant, and, in the second place,
ing it intolerably. It is easy to
one must experience a feeling' of
surprise, if not of doubt, on a first
imagine a case in which the
reading of these decisions. That
director has knowledge of matters
such a feeling is not unnatural ap- -for example, pending negotiaappears by the comments of the tions-which publicity would ruin
text-writers. Of the Indiana case
and which his undoubted duty to
in particular, which it must be ad- the corporatiion compels him to
mitted was an extreme case, Taylor
keep secret. It would be a hardin his book on Corporations, 698,
ship to lay down a hard and fast
note, says: "The transaction which
rule that a director under such cirin this case was allowed to stand
cumstances cannot acquire any of
seems to the writer to have been
the company's stock without puteminently unfair, and, indeed, a- ting himself in the position of losrule-for which this decision is
ing his money if the negotiations
are unsuccessful and the stock decertainly authority-that directors
preciates, or losing his stock if the
in their dealings with shareholders
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negotiations succeed and the stock
goes up. This would be holding
him to the strictest measure of a
trustee's accountability. Another
point is forcibly made by SUNDERLAND, J., in Carpenter v. Danforth,
52 Barb., 586: "It will not do," he
says, "to make the principle generally applicable to purchases by
directors of the stock of their corporations. As to stocks which have
a regularly quoted price or market
value, parties generally sell and
buy them with reference to this
price or value, rather than with
reference to their real value,
or any opinion of their real
value, founded on a knowledge
or supposed knowledge of the
condition of the corporations or
of their affairs. As to such stock,
would it do to make the purchase
of it by a director, though it happened to be the stock of his own
corporation, an exception, and to
say that the parties dealt with reference to the real condition of the
corporation and the supposed real
value of the stock, founded on a
knowledge or supposed knowledge
of its affairs? Plainly it would not;
and plainly, in such case, the application of the principle of equity
would. be unreasonable. But the
duty arising from the mere trust
relation must be the same in all
cases where the same trust relation
exists; for courts of equity, though
they deal with special cases, apply
general principles."
The rule, then, appears to be
that in general the relation is not
fiduciary, but is one in which the
peculiar circumstances are to determine whether the particular parties stand in such a relation to each
other. Equity will relieve in every
case in which "influence has been
acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and beIS

trayed" (Bispham, Equity, j 231).
Thus, beside the ordinary instances
of trustee and cesltui que trust,
guardian and ward, attorney and
client, parent and child, husband
and wife, it has been held that the
relations were confidential between
partners, principal and agent, physician and patient, persons betrothed, a spiritual "medium" and
a believer in spiritualism, sisters,
and similar relations: Darlington's
Estate, 147 Pa., 624; Beach, Mod125,
ern Equity Jurisprudence,
et seq. Such a rule, perhaps,
affords to the stockholder as much
protection as the courts can safely
afford him, without imposing an
intolerable burden upon the director or officer. It was the rule applied by the Master in the principal case, and may be'so applied
as to prevent gross injustice. It is
to be observed of the Indiana case,
which certainly appears a flagrant
instance of unfair dealing, first,
that the case is badly reported and
the facts not fully stated; and, second, that the wrong perpetrated
would seem to have been against
the whole body of stockholders,
and the right of the plaintiff to
maintain abill might be questioned;
and of the New Jersey case, that
the action was a common law action of deceit, and not, in form at
least, an application to a chancellor for relief.
In reading this case it must be
distinctly borne in mind that it
proceeds on the assumption that
there was no knowledge on the
part of the defendant of the materiality of the fact that the contract had been made which proved
so advantageous. That being a
matter of fact, it is unimportant to
the case, as a precedent, whether the
fact was correctly decided or not.
J. D. BROWN, JR.

